debate focuses on whether improvements to the fiduciary duty doctrine can be attained through expansion 9 or curtailment 10 of the doctrine.
The academic debate on options for improvement of the fiduciary duty doctrine has ignored the possible role of Corporate Integrity Agreements (CIAs). CIAs are administratively-enforced compliance programs funded by health care companies but enforced by the government. In other words, they are contracts between health care companies and the federal government and can involve costly mandatory compliance measures and penalties.
11
Because the directors contractually agree to increase compliance by way of an open door policy with the government, 12 CIAs can substantially increase the risk of liability for companies whose directors do not act in accordance 75, 77 (2005) . 10 Ribstein, supra note 7, at 900 (arguing for a more precise definition and more limited application of fiduciary duties). 11 
See generally GREG LUCE, HEALTH CARE LITIGATION STRATEGIES: LEADING LAWYERS ON ANALYZING RECENT HEALTH CARE LITIGATION TRENDS, DEVELOPING SUCCESSFUL CASE STRATEGIES, AND PROTECTING CLIENT RIGHTS, DEFENDING THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT'S EXPANDING AND NOVEL THEORIES OF LIABILITY (2011).
12 A board that executes a CIA agrees to increased governmental scrutiny, including, but not limited to, granting permission for government site visits during the term of the CIA. Corporate Integrity Agreement FAQ, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., https://oig.hhs.gov/faqs/corporateintegrity-agreements-faq.asp (last visited Aug. 1, 2013) [hereinafter Corporate Integrity Agreement FAQ] ("[The purpose of a site visit is] to verify the entity's compliance with the terms of its Corporate Integrity Agreement and to provide OIG with an opportunity to observe an entity's compliance program in practice. The firsthand observations obtained while on site provide the OIG with a more accurate and comprehensive assessment of an entity's compliance program. The site visit also offers the entity the unique, one-on-one opportunity to educate us regarding the entity's operations. OIG has also found that site visits help foster more effective communication between the entity and the OIG.").
with their fiduciary responsibilities. While CIAs are outside the traditional legal framework that formally defines fiduciary duties, they fit into the penumbra of extra-legal forces 13 that help to clarify the expectations for directors.
The contractual obligations in CIAs can enhance directors' fiduciary duties, expanding the duty of care for directors of health care corporations beyond the legal standard under Caremark 14 and Ritter. 15 The duties imposed in a CIA can include, among others: the passing of specific resolutions; appointment of a chief compliance officer (CCO); agreement that the CCO will increase the frequency of reports to the board; board certification of compliance with the CIA; reporting of compliance issues to the relevant authorities; and annual reviews through an independent review organization. 16 Courts are increasingly recognizing the role of CIAs and their implications for directors' fiduciary duties. 17 A prominent recent decision, In re Pfizer, 18 illustrates the role of CIAs in the evolution of fiduciary duties. Although the court in Pfizer did not conclude that the CIAs actually created fiduciary duties, the court opined that the CIAs "imposed affirmative obligations on Pfizer's board that went well beyond the basic fiduciary duties required by Delaware law."
19 A broad reading of this phraseology suggests that fiduciary duties could perhaps be augmented by contractual arrangements such as CIAs. Should other courts follow this reasoning, fiduciary duties-and more specifically directors' basic legal duty of care-could over time expand in the CIA context. This article includes five parts. Part II introduces the academic debate on the scope and expansion of fiduciary duties. Part III explores the main characteristics of CIAs, their reach and scope, and common denominators in executed CIAs. Part IV outlines the role of CIAs in expanding the law of fiduciary duties both as a contractual addendum and as a hybrid form of aspirational corporate governance.
The authors delineate the role of CIAs in fiduciary duties by discussing relevant case law. After exploring the benefits of CIAs for the expansion of fiduciary duties, the authors outline possible limitations. Part V concludes the article.
II. EXPANDING FIDUCIARY DUTIES
The law of fiduciary duties has evolved as a result of both judicial decisions (traditional legal holdings as well as non-adjudicatory writings) and traditional equity and standards-based approaches to governance duties. 20 Traditionally, only two fiduciary duties existed, the duties of loyalty and care. 21 But, fiduciary duty law has evolved in the past few decades and fiduciary duties have expanded. 22 24 Hill & McDonnell, supra note 3, at 848. 25 Johnson & Sides, supra note 5, at 1199. Johnson and Sides point out that, rather than assessing whether directors followed specific rules, judges review the manner in which directors acted. This "process" approach allows a "tailored" response to breach of fiduciary duty claims, resulting in incremental changes to fiduciary duty norms over time. Johnson 
The academic debate on the scope and reach of fiduciary duties has endured for more than three decades. There is some consensus that fiduciary duties are too vague and should be better defined. 26 A minority of scholars prefer a limited application of fiduciary duties, 27 citing as a particular concern the expansion of fiduciary duties via federal law. 28 To avoid confusion and inconsistency in the law of fiduciary duties, these scholars conceptualize fiduciary duties as a type of contract 29 and a duty of unselfishness. 30 This narrower definition of fiduciary duties is rooted in the concept of entrustment; when the an "obligation to be reasonably informed," that they must "exercise reasonable oversight," and that directors must "assure a reasonable information and reporting system" exists. Johnson 29 Ribstein, supra note 7, at 902. 30 Ribstein, supra note 7, at 899-900 (arguing that a broader view of fiduciary duties has significant limitations and that the strictness of the duty of unselfishness requires a limited scope). In Meinhard v. Salmon, Justice Cardozo famously described fiduciary duties: "Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. . . . A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior." Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). Ribstein found such a strict duty to be "only rarely appropriate in a competitive marketplace," so therefore only required in relationships where power was entrusted to a non-owner. Ribstein, supra note 7, at 903. Instead of a broad, vague approach to fiduciary duties, Ribstein believed parties should be able to contractually adjust the duties promised and be held to a simple duty of unselfishness in relationships where there is an entrustment of power. Ribstein, supra note 7, at 907.
control of an organization is separated from the ownership of that organization, the fiduciary duty owed by the controllers protects the owners. 31 In these relationships, it would be costly or impracticable for the owner to fully monitor the controller. 32 Hence, fiduciary duties exist to compensate for owners' inability to fully monitor the controllers. 33 A substantial part of the literature supports the expansion of fiduciary duties. 34 The leading argument for the expansion of fiduciary duties is that the traditional fiduciary duty doctrine is inconsistent and can result in cases with problematic outcomes. 35 An increasing number of scholars argue that extra-legal forces can further shape and expand corporate law. 36 The law alone may not always require corporate directors to fulfill their fiduciary duty to shareholders, but extra-legal forces can help fill the gaps. 37 Because state fiduciary duty law is permissive rather than regulatory, fiduciary standards can develop from non-legislative sources. 38 The overall umbrella of fiduciary responsibilities is arguably non-binding, more akin to corporate 'best practices,' and aspirational in nature, making extra-legal forces a legitimate source that can help shape fiduciary duties. 39 Extra-legal sources include, among others, the advice given by a corporation's law firm, judicial pronouncements made outside the traditional legal opinion, and influential academic views in today's corporate governance scholarship. 40 These extra-legal forces can create norms that help guide directors.
III. CORPORATE INTEGRITY AGREEMENTS
Corporate integrity agreements can have an impact on fiduciary duties and corporate governance. CIAs are administratively-enforced compliance programs funded by health care companies but enforced by the government. CIAs can enhance directors' fiduciary duties if directors contractually agree to increase compliance for the companies they manage. Through this mechanism, CIAs increase the stakes for companies whose directors do not act in accordance with their fiduciary responsibilities. Enforcement of CIAs can result in costly mandatory compliance measures and penalties. 42 The enhanced duties that can be imposed on boards include: appointment of a chief compliance officer (CCO); agreement that the CCO will increase the frequency of reports to the board; board certification of compliance with the CIA; reporting of compliance issues to the relevant authorities; and annual reviews through an independent review organization. CIAs are not part of the legal framework that defines fiduciary duties. However, CIAs are part of the penumbra of extra-legal forces 43 that can expand and help clarify the scope of fiduciary duties.
A. Background
CIAs are a relatively new phenomenon. Beginning in the 1990s, the Department of Health and Human Services Office of the Inspector General (OIG) started using CIAs to resolve False Claims Act investigations. 44 CIAs have evolved from an informal set of selfdisclosure programs into a formalized process, 45 requiring the OIG to negotiate CIAs with health care providers and other entities as part of settlements in the context of health care program investigations under false claims statutes. 46 In exchange for providers' agreement to be bound by the CIA's substantive provisions, the OIG does not exclude the providers from participation in federal health care programs, including Medicare and Medicaid. 47 In effect, the OIG uses providers' participation in federal health care programs, and the revenues generated through participation, as leverage to negotiate substantive
provisions in CIAs that increase compliance with expected conduct and overall welfare. The provisions in CIAs are diverse and depend on the specific terms of the settlement. CIAs are generally adjusted to the factspecific requirements of the individual company and take preexisting compliance programs into account. 48 During the term of a CIA, the company that executed the CIA with the government is required to increase compliance functions, including upgrades to the internal compliance structure, increased third-party oversight, and enhanced reporting requirements. 49 In effect, a company that executes a CIA agrees to increased government scrutiny including OIG site visits during the term of the CIA. 50 Noncompliance with a CIA carries serious penalties. Upon noncompliance with the terms of a CIA, the OIG can prosecute the company or seek its exclusion from federal health care programs.
51
The penalties under CIAs affect the respective entity and individuals who work for the entity. For instance, companies subject to supervision by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) may not employ individuals who were dismissed for CIA violations as a 48 See Corporate Integrity Agreements, supra note 16 ("A comprehensive CIA typically lasts 5 years and includes requirements to: hire a compliance officer/appoint a compliance committee; develop written standards and policies; implement a comprehensive employee training program; retain an independent review organization to conduct annual reviews; establish a confidential disclosure program; restrict employment of ineligible persons; report overpayments, reportable events, and ongoing investigations/legal proceedings; and provide an implementation report and annual reports to OIG on the status of the entity's compliance activities."). 49 James N. 
52 The careers of directors and officers in the pharmaceutical industry who were prosecuted in the context of CIA violations can be severely affected.
53
CIAs can also facilitate the pursuit of increased sanctions against noncompliant companies. Certification requirements in CIAs, which require directors and officers to certify compliance with the CIA's provisions, can lower procedural and enforcement hurdles. 54 The number of individuals who are required to provide certifications under CIAs has dramatically increased in the past few years and the certification requirements go well beyond the certification requirements for the CCO. 55 With the increased number of individuals certifying compliance with CIA provisions, the potential for false certifications and corresponding liability intensifies.
56

B. Characteristics
CIAs have several core characteristics that distinguish them from other contractual arrangements between companies and the government. CIAs often become the standard for expected conduct in a civil or criminal trial. 57 
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CIA has been executed, it is much easier for the government to reopen a case than to pursue a new one. 59 The OIG's increased scrutiny, the potential for crippling penalties, and the ease of further prosecution can have a substantial impact on the knowledge, monitoring, and management of boards of companies that operate under a CIA.
A CIA increases the stakes for directors choosing to eschew their governance responsibilities. A company operating under a CIA is essentially on parole. 60 CIAs give the government direct access to a health care corporation, facilitating the detection of compliance issues. 61 A corporation that executed a CIA often gives the OIG permission to inspect the company's compliance documents and conduct on-site inspections to assess its compliance with the CIA. 62 Should the government find problems upon inspection, it can increase the penalties beyond the CIA's substantive provisions. 63 These penalties include criminal prosecution, fines, additional CIAs, and exclusion from federally funded health care programs. 64 The $2.3 billion Pfizer settlement in 2009 illustrates how significant possible ramifications can be for companies that engage in illegal activities after executing a CIA.
65
C. Reach and Scope
By imposing stringent and detailed compliance requirements, CIAs can take an active role in the day-to-day compliance functions of corporations. CIAs affect these day-to-day compliance operations by increasing the role of the Chief Compliance Officer (CCO). Should a regulated entity not have a CCO, a CIA typically mandates the appointment of a CCO. 66 The CCO is responsible for implementing
the CIA and must generally report directly to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), not to the General Counsel or Chief Financial Officer (CFO). 67 CCOs under CIAs usually have direct access to the boards of directors. 68 CIAs typically require companies to create or maintain a compliance committee that supports the CCOs in fulfilling the additional obligations and duties imposed by the CIA. 69 The compliance committee is usually chaired by the CCO.
CIAs can include specific provisions prescribing the conduct of the boards of directors. 70 For instance, CIAs can mandate the number of board meetings dedicated to the review of the company's compliance program. 71 CIAs may even require boards to adopt specific resolutions to certify the company's compliance with the CIA and
increase reporting obligations. 72 In effect, these provisions allow the government to contractually determine how and when a board will interact. The certification requirements can lead directors to require more detailed reports from the corporate officers and take a greater role in overseeing the company's compliance with both the CIA and federal regulations.
In addition to increasing board obligations and duties of the CCO, CIAs can require a number of other compliance measures. Companies operating under a CIA may be required to develop and implement a written code of conduct, 73 often used to define and explain the role of the CCO. 74 A code of conduct implemented under a CIA may merely require the company's full compliance with federal, state, and local laws, 75 but it can also demand compliance with FDA requirements, 76 or require compliance with voluntary codes. 77 Codes of conduct also list the consequences of noncompliance with the company's policies and procedures, the federal health care program, or FDA requirements. 78 Codes of conduct should encourage disclosure of compliance issues and protect whistle blowers from retaliation by maintaining the anonymity of disclosures. 79 Other CIA provisions require companies to self-report compliance issues to the government, notify the government of communications with the FDA, establish a field force monitoring program, monitor 72 See, e.g., AstraZeneca CIA, supra note 70, at 6-7 ("[This resolution] shall be signed by each individual member of the Board or the Committee, summarizing its review and oversight of matters relating to AstraZeneca's compliance with Federal health care program requirements, FDA requirements, and the obligations of this CIA. . . . The CIA goes on set forth the required minimum language to be used in this resolution:] 'The Board of Directors [or a Committee of the Board] has made a reasonable inquiry into the operations of AstraZeneca LP and AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP's Compliance Program for the period ____, including but not limited to evaluating its effectiveness and receiving updates about the activities of its U.S. Compliance Officer and other compliance personnel. Based on its inquiry, the Board [or the Committee] has concluded that, to the best of its knowledge, AstraZeneca LP and AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP have implemented an effective U.S. Compliance Program to meet Federal health care program requirements, FDA requirements, and the obligations of the Corporate Integrity Agreement.' If the Board cannot certify such a conclusion in the required resolution, it must set forth the reasons why it is unable to do so and the steps it is taking to
non-promotional activities, provide mandatory compliance training and education for employees, upgrade review procedures, increase disclosure programs, define ineligible persons for employment, and report physician payments. 80 All of these additional requirements, especially the self-reporting provisions, require companies to spend additional resources and, at times, alter their day-to-day operations after signing a CIA.
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IV. THE ROLE OF CIAS IN EXPANDING FIDUCIARY DUTIES
Courts differentiate between the law and aspirational corporate governance. 82 Corporate fiduciary duties and remedies for duty violations are not aspirational goals of ideal corporate governance practices.
83
Aspirational ideas for boards' corporate governance practices do not define standards of liability. 84 Although CIAs are not laws, they do go beyond aspirational governance standards. CIAs set forth concrete governance rules that expand the fiduciary duties of directors. CIAs clearly define the duties of directors to be informed, exercise oversight, and establish effective reporting systemsrequiring a higher standard of care for directors operating under a CIA.
Several characteristics distinguish CIAs from both the fiduciary duties doctrine and from regular contracts. Unlike the traditional fiduciary duties doctrine, CIAs set out mandatory and clearly defined best practices for companies. Unlike private contracts, companies execute CIAs to avoid further prosecution by the government for various health care fraud charges and to avoid being excluded from Medicaid and Medicare. If the government decides a CIA is warranted, the company's hands are tied if it wants to continue to operate within its industry.
CIAs combine elements of contractual and public enforcement. As a contractual arrangement, the terms of the CIA between the company and the government dictate heightened compliance duties for the company. Unlike regular contractual arrangements, however, the enforcement of CIAs goes beyond contractual remedies. The OIG may enforce CIAs and private rights of action may also come into play. Because of the combination of enforcement mechanisms, CIAs
are more than contractual arrangements. Under Delaware law, CIAs may not only be enforced by the OIG, but also by the courts via a derivative suit.
85
A. Contractual Addendum to Increase Duties
In lieu of a special hybrid category for CIAs, they are first and foremost contracts. As contracts, CIAs can create a contractual addendum to existing legal duties. To the extent that CIAs mandate specific actions in the day-to-day operations of boards of directors, CIAs can expand boards' duties. For instance, although federal law prohibits off-label marketing of drugs and devices, 86 boards are consistently held not liable for companies' illegal marketing efforts. 87 However, boards that certify compliance with a CIA are certifying that the company is properly monitoring the promotional activities of its sales teams. Through such certifications, CIAs contractually expand the applicable legal standards for boards.
CIAs can contractually expand directors' duties beyond the Caremark standard and its progeny. Several CIA features suggest that directors are held to a higher standard after a CIA has been executed. Individual CIA provisions can put boards on notice, highlight extra care requirements in specific areas of operation, and enable the directors to increase their knowledge of the corporation's activities and corresponding compliance requirements, making it easier to carefully and effectively monitor the organization. More specifically, because CIAs often mandate a CCO and dictate how the CCO interacts with the board, CIAs can increase boards' knowledge and monitoring of the company's compliance. 88 If a board possesses such knowledge, it should play a bigger role in ensuring that the company meets federal and state standards. Moreover, CIAs often require boards to pass specific resolutions certifying compliance. 89 Besides
increasing boards' operational knowledge (thus allowing for a more comprehensive approach to governance), CIAs also demand assurances that boards are meeting their fiduciary duties.
CIA provisions can create economic incentives that affect directors' diligence in exercising their duties. CIAs can have harsh economic consequences for companies. CIAs provide for penalties in cases of noncompliance. Companies agree in their respective CIA to pay penalties for each day of noncompliance with the agreement. Penalties can add up to thousands of dollars per day. 90 Additionally, most federal health law regulations provide for monetary penalties in cases of noncompliance. Because of the required self-reporting, a company operating under a CIA may be required to report violations of the False Claims Act, Sunshine, Stark, AKS, HIPAA, or other federal health laws. 91 Adding the stipulated penalties in CIAs to the monetary penalties under federal health laws, companies that executed CIAs face significant financial ramifications.
B. Delineating the Role of CIAs in Fiduciary Duties
Caremark underscores that a lack of oversight claim "is possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win judgment."
92 Courts dismiss duty of care cases routinely at the pleading stage. 93 Courts, however, treat companies that executed a CIA differently. 90 AstraZeneca CIA, supra note 70, at 6. 91 See AstraZeneca CIA, supra note 70, at 52. 92 In re Caremark Int'l. Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996) . 93 A number of recent cases illustrate that courts have not allowed breach of fiduciary duty suits to proceed when plaintiffs did not make demand upon the boards and failed to adequately plead demand futility. See King v. Baldino, 648 F. Supp. 94 illustrates the role of CIAs in the evolution of fiduciary duties. Although the court in Pfizer did not conclude that the CIAs actually created fiduciary duties, the court opined that the CIAs "imposed affirmative obligations on Pfizer's board that went well beyond the basic fiduciary duties required by Delaware law." 95 A broader reading of this phraseology suggests that fiduciary duties could perhaps be augmented by contractual arrangements such as CIAs. Following this reasoning, it seems possible that future courts could interpret CIAs as expanding the basic legal duty of care.
In a case with fairly egregious facts, the New Jersey District Court dismissed a derivative complaint against the Johnson & Johnson ("J&J") board for failure to plead demand. 96 Plaintiffs alleged that the J&J directors breached their fiduciary duty "by permitting and fostering a culture of systematic, calculated and widespread legal violations." 97 No CIA had been executed before the alleged misconduct. 98 Plaintiffs did not make a demand on the board before filing suit. 99 Plaintiffs' allegations stated that directors should have known about the company's questionable acts because J&J received FDA warning letters, an FDA report, subpoenas from the state attorney general, qui tam complaints, a criminal plea, and a settlement agreement with the Department of Justice. 100 The court looked to
Brehm v. Eisner
101 to analyze the case, given the "weighty allegations of corporate misconduct and director inaction." 102 The Brehm court described its case as a case concerning whether directors may be held personally liable "for lack of due care in the corporate decisionmaking process" -not as a case about whether the directors failed to establish and implement "ideal corporate governance practices." 103 The Brehm court stipulated: "the law of corporate fiduciary duties and
120 Although the VCP was not a CIA, the Seventh Circuit used it as evidence that the directors knew of and should have stopped noncompliant activities.
121
To summarize, courts assume that the boards of companies that executed a CIA have more knowledge and can exercise more control and should thus act with a heightened fiduciary duty. Directors are held to a higher standard if the company executed a CIA. The courts in In re Pfizer and Abbott Labs found that Pfizer's CIA and Abbott's VCP increased the boards' knowledge about compliance issues, and the directors should have increased their monitoring to prevent further violations.
122 Neither court accepted the directors' arguments that they did not know about the noncompliance, because executing a CIA or CIA-like agreement means directors do know, or should know, about the respective noncompliance issues.
123
The Pfizer and Abbot Labs decisions suggest that CIAs and VCPs can change courts' evaluations of fiduciary duties. Courts assume that boards operating under CIAs have more knowledge and exercise more control. However, it is unclear if corporations with CIAs will be uniformly affected. In light of the Pfizer precedent, future courts could hold directors of corporations that executed CIAs to a higher standard and thereby expand their basic legal duty of care if the facts suggest that CIAs provided directors with more knowledge about compliance activities.
C. Limitations
Several important conceptual and legal distinctions separate the fiduciary duties created under Delaware precedents and the contractual obligations under CIAs. CIAs have so far been predominantly used in the health care industry. 125 Health care companies serve the greater good and their mission goes beyond the mere maximization of shareholder value. 126 Directors acting on behalf of their corporations in the health care industry face unique challenges. Like other directors, directors in the health care industry are required to make Audit Committee to certify that it has made reasonable inquiries into the Compliance Program and that Pfizer is meeting the obligations of the CIA. With each certification, Pfizer's directors are promising that they are exercising proper oversight, and acting with adequate knowledge); see also In re Pfizer Inc., 722 F. Supp. 2d at 461 (" [T] here is no reason to believe this reporting requirement was not fully complied with, thus guaranteeing that each member of the board was bombarded with allegations of continuing misconduct of the very kind that the prior settlements looked to the board to prevent."). 125 126 The Medtronic Mission Statement illustrates the idea that a health care corporation can (and should) strive for more than just profits: "To contribute to human welfare by application of biomedical engineering in the research, design, manufacture, and sale of instruments or appliances that alleviate pain, restore health, and extend life. To direct our growth in the areas of biomedical engineering where we display maximum strength and ability; to gather people and facilities that tend to augment these areas; to continuously build on these areas through education and knowledge assimilation; to avoid participation in areas where we cannot make unique and worthy contributions. To strive without reserve for the greatest possible reliability and quality in our products; to be the unsurpassed standard of comparison and to be recognized as a company of dedication, honesty, integrity, and service. To make a fair profit on current operations to meet our obligations, sustain our growth, and reach our goals. To recognize the personal worth of employees by providing an employment framework that allows personal satisfaction in work accomplished, security, advancement opportunity, and means to share in the company's success. To maintain good citizenship as a company."
Our Mission, MEDTRONIC, http://www.medtronic.com/about-medtronic/our-mission/index.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2014). The directors are an essential part of such mission: "The corporate director . . . is a bedrock of the health care delivery system. The oversight activities provided by the director help form the corporate vision, and at the same time promote an environment of corporate responsibility that protects the mission of the corporation and the health care consumers it serves." OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. OF well-informed decisions, oversee the business, 127 and ensure that their respective corporations comply with the law. 128 However, the unique features of health care corporations, in combination with a complex array of federal and state health care legislation, 129 create special challenges for directors in the health care industry. Directors of health care corporations need to balance the needs of many stakeholders such as patients, physicians, taxpayers, the government, and shareholders. Even small health care companies may have a global reach and their directors' decisions can therefore affect a broad array of constituents. 130 Substantial government involvement and responsibility through Medicare and Medicaid may further complicate the administration of health care providers since the taxpaying public is also a stakeholder. 131 Given the public good or quasi-public good character of the health care industry, the application of CIAs in industries outside of health 
V. CONCLUSION
CIAs add an important element to the academic debate on the expansion of fiduciary duties. As a unique hybrid category, CIAs transcend the law of fiduciary duties and aspirational corporate governance. Courts are increasingly recognizing the role of CIAs and their capacity to expand directors' fiduciary duties. A broad reading of In re Pfizer suggests that CIAs can augment fiduciary default duties. Given the characteristics of CIAs and courts' increasing recognition of CIAs, courts may interpret CIAs and other hybrid forms, such as deferred prosecution agreements, as expanding the basic legal duty of care. More research and empirical work may be needed to explore how CIAs and other hybrid forms may change or expand directors' obligations.
